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Note
PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS: DEFINING THE ELUSIVE
TRADEMARK-COPYRIGHT DIVIDE
KATHRYN M. FOLEY
Fictional characters have become exceptionally valuable assets, now
consistently the subject of lucrative licensing agreements. Their unique
ability to serve expressive as well as source identifying functions supports
such agreements by allowing strong intellectual property protection to be
granted under both copyright and trademark doctrines. Nonetheless, the
intellectual property protection afforded to fictional characters must be
carefully considered in order to avoid unjustified encroachments upon the
public domain. This Article examines the copyright and trademark
protection available to fictional characters and offers a mechanism for
ensuring that such protection does not lead to the creation of
impermissible, perpetual copyrights. The protection available to fictional
characters under copyright law is discussed at length, with a particular
focus on the various standards of copyrightability. This Article also
evaluates the protection available under trademark law, emphasizing the
ability of general public recognition to distort the trademark analysis.
Finally, in examining the broader consequences of providing both
copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters, this Article
proposes that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox be explicitly incorporated into the trademark analysis for
fictional characters. Careful adherence to the principals of Dastar will
substantially improve the quality of trademark protection provided to
fictional characters, thereby ensuring that any encroachment upon the
public domain is in fact justified.
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PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS: DEFINING THE ELUSIVE
TRADEMARK-COPYRIGHT DIVIDE
KATHRYN M. FOLEY∗
I. INTRODUCTION
For over ninety years, Forbes has kept tabs on the rich, famous and
infamous. From Bill Gates to Will Smith to General Electric, Forbes
routinely calculates the net worth of billionaires, movie stars and Fortune
500 companies.1 In 2002, Forbes added a new dimension to its collection
of rankings, the Forbes Fictional Fifteen.2 The Forbes Fictional Fifteen
employs an enchanted formula reflecting both real-world and animatedworld values to calculate the net worth of our favorite fictional characters.3
The top breadwinner for 2007 was Walt Disney’s own, Scrooge McDuck.4
The uncle of Donald Duck, Scrooge McDuck was estimated to have a net
worth of over $28.8 billion.5
As bizarre as the Forbes Fictional Fifteen and its champion Scrooge
McDuck may first appear, this imaginary list resonates with real world
implications. Fictional characters have moved far beyond the traditional
boundaries of books and magazines, landing on movie screens, television
sets, video games, stuffed animals and Happy Meals®. Fictional characters
have become such valuable assets that the licensing of Walt Disney
characters alone generates nearly $20 billion a year in retail sales.6 Not
surprisingly, the intellectual property protection available to fictional
characters has expanded remarkably, in close parallel with their substantial
rise in economic value.
This Article analyzes the intellectual property protection of fictional
characters. Part II examines the protection available under copyright law.
∗
University of Connecticut, Doctor of Pharmacy 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law,
J.D. Candidate 2009. I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for his insightful comments
and guidance. This Note is dedicated to my family for their constant support and encouragement
throughout my academic career.
1
See, e.g., Lea Goldman, The Celebrity 100, FORBES, July 2, 2007, at 82; Matthew Miller, The
Forbes 400 List of Billionaires, FORBES, Oct. 8, 2007, at 72; Stewart Pinkerton, America’s 400 Best
Big Companies, FORBES, Jan. 7, 2008, at 97.
2
Michael Noer, The Forbes Fictional Fifteen, FORBES.COM, Sept. 13, 2002, http://www.forbes.
com/2002/09/13/400fictional.html.
3
Id.
4
Michael Noer, The Forbes Fictional Fifteen, FORBES.COM, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/11/richest-fictional-characters-oped-books-fict1507cx_mn_de_1211fictional15_land.html.
5
Id.
6
Andrea K. Walker, The Allure of SpongeBob, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 29, 2006, at 1D, available
at LEXIS, News Library, BALSUN File.
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Particular attention is paid to the development of different standards of
copyrightability, including the weaknesses of early standards and the
eventual convergence of circuit splits to standards similar in principal, if
not in name. Part III evaluates the trademark protection available to
fictional characters, emphasizing the ability of public recognition to warp
the trademark analysis. Several methods for limiting the influence of a
character’s popularity are proposed, including separating the trademark
analysis into its constituent parts and focusing on those areas where
fictional characters often fail to meet the statutory requirements for
protection.7
Part IV of this Article examines the broader consequences of providing
both copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters. This
section assesses the influence of trademark protection on the copyright fair
use analysis as well as the value of providing trademark protection after the
expiration of a copyright term. Part V proposes that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox be explicitly
incorporated into the trademark analysis of fictional characters.8 Careful
adherence to the holding of Dastar will appropriately shift the trademark
analysis away from a character’s general popularity and instead focus the
analysis on the statutory requirements of trademark law, improving the
quality of trademark protection and mitigating the potential negative
effects of providing both copyright and trademark protection.9
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Copyright law reflects a carefully crafted bargain wherein authors are
provided certain exclusive rights, for a limited time, to incentivize the
creation of new works of authorship and enrich the public domain.10 On
one hand, copyright protection affords authors the ability to control the use
of their artistic creations, including the exclusive right to reproduce and
perform the work, as well as the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works for the duration of the copyright term.11 On the other hand, the
public retains the right to make fair use of the work, as well as the right to
7

See infra text accompanying notes 204–05.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (defining the term
“origin of goods” in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act to refer “[only] to the producer of the tangible goods
that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
those goods”); see text accompanying notes 257–71.
9
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35–38.
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the authority “[t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries”); see Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Serv. Co., 768
F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The copyright laws are designed to give people incentives to produce
new works. They allow people to collect the reward for their contributions.”) (internal citations
omitted).
11
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2000).
8

2009]

PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

925

12

copy the work once it falls into the public domain. The copyright bargain
is “predicated upon the premises that the public benefits from the creative
activities of authors” and assumes, that in the absence of public benefit, the
grant of copyright protection would be unjustified.13
Copyright protection provides authors with a legal mechanism to
control the use and exploitation of the characters they create.14 It allows
authors to reap the benefits of their creative labor, influence the
development of their characters in subsequent works, and inhibit others
from misappropriating their intellectual property—the fictional characters
themselves.15 Yet, underlying this concept of copyright protection for
fictional characters is the assumption that a fictional character is deserving
of copyright protection separate from the original work in which the
character first appears. This issue is most relevant in instances where a
fictional character is merely one aspect of a larger work, such as a book or
movie that is itself subject to copyright protection. While at first glance it
may appear unnecessarily duplicative to provide separate copyright
protection to fictional characters, a closer look reveals that separate
protection is necessary both to protect the underlying work, and to protect
the character—itself an original work of authorship. For instance, if
Mickey Mouse was not subject to copyright protection separate from the
original cartoon in which he first appeared, Walt Disney would not have
12

Id. § 107.
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (1990).
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.”).
15
17 U.S.C. § 106. In 1964, despite the increasing economic value of fictional characters, the
Register of Copyrights refused to create a specific subject matter category for fictional characters. The
Register of Copyrights stated: “As is equally true in the case of detailed presentations of plot setting, or
dramatic action, we believe it would be unnecessary and misleading to specify fictional characters as a
separate class of copyrightable works.” NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12. Nonetheless, the 1976
revision of the Copyright Act considerably expanded the scope of copyrightable subject matter to
include “all original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006). The revision also enumerated seven categories of works of authorship. Id. § 102(a). While
fictional characters were not explicitly listed as works of authorship, courts have routinely found
fictional characters to fall within the statutory categories of the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Kenner Prods. Div., 443 F. Supp. 291, 296, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding it “clear that a copyright in a
dramatic work such as a movie or a play can extend to cover the characters contained therein . . . .”).
The subsequent failure of Congress to legislatively overrule the numerous cases establishing copyright
protection in fictional characters provides further indication that copyright protection of fictional
characters is consistent with the Copyright Act. See Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930) (granting, for the first time, a separate copyright to a fictional character).
13
14
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retained a meaningful, exclusive right to create derivative works. Instead,
the public could have created an infinite number of works embodying the
Mickey Mouse character outside of the original cartoon, and the Walt
Disney empire would have been effectively halted at Steamboat Willie.16
Furthermore, Mickey Mouse presents a strong case for the argument that
even when a fictional character appears in an underlying work subject to
copyright protection, the fictional character itself remains an original work
of authorship, and a proper subject of individual copyright protection.
Mickey Mouse is certainly more than a component part of Steamboat
Willie. Mickey Mouse is a separate entity, deserving of separate copyright
protection.
Providing copyright protection to fictional characters is not without
cost. The Supreme Court recognized an “inherent tension in the need [to]
simultaneously protect copyright material and to allow others to build upon
it”17 Many great characters have been borrowed directly from the works of
others, and numerous characters have found new life in subsequent
works.18 For instance, in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, the
author builds a storyline around two obscure characters taken directly from
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.19 In Mary Reilly, the author imaginatively retells
the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde from the point of view of the doctor’s
maid.20 “The creations of others are the building blocks of commerce as
well as art. Progress relies on a general indulgence of copying . . . .”21 The
copyright bargain thereby provides exclusive rights to authors with the
understanding that the protected works will ultimately serve to enrich the
public domain.
The development of copyright protection for fictional characters has
been riddled with uncertainty and inconsistency as courts have struggled to
fit fictional characters into the rubric of copyright law.22 In part, as a
response to this uncertainty, the copyright infringement analysis of
fictional characters has evolved into a two-part inquiry.23 As a threshold
16
Jesse Green, Building a Better Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File.
17
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
18
Shakespeare, Moliere, Spenser, Byron, Dickens, Rabelais and Hugo have all made significant
use of the works of others in the creation of their characters. See ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM
AND ORIGINALITY 35, 60, 62–63, 86, 89 (1952).
19
TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967).
20
VALERIE MARTIN, MARY REILLY (1990).
21
Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429,
438 (1986). Justice Story noted “no man who put pen to paper labored unaided and uninstructed.
Every writer borrowed and had to borrow; his thoughts were a combination of what others had thought
and expressed before him, modified or exalted by his own genius.” LINDEY, supra note 18, at 20.
22
See infra notes 23–76 and accompanying text.
23
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (“A claim for copyright infringement requires that the plaintiff prove (1) its ownership of
the copyright in a particular [character], and (2) the defendant’s copying of a substantial, legally
protectable portion of such [character].”).
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matter, a court first determines whether the fictional character is a proper
subject of copyright.24 Only after a character is found to be worthy of
individual copyright protection does the court engage in the second
inquiry, evaluating the infringing work for substantial similarity.25
A. The Distinct Delineation Standard
The first prong of the copyright infringement inquiry, determining
whether a fictional character is a proper subject of copyright, has proven to
be a significant challenge for courts. One important standard for
evaluating this issue, the distinct delineation standard, originated in the
1930 decision Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.26 In Nichols, the
plaintiff alleged that Universal’s film, The Cohens and the Kellys,
infringed upon the plot and character of her play, Abie’s Irish Rose.27 In
analyzing the case, Judge Learned Hand established for the first time that a
fictional character could be protected “quite independently of the plot.”28
Nevertheless, Judge Hand was careful to emphasize the limited nature of
copyright protection available to fictional characters, stating:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible
that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch
or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for
one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept
wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and
foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. These
would be no more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the play, as
little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s Doctrine of
Relativity, or Darwin’s theory of the Origin of Species. It
follows that the less developed the characters, the less they
can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear
for marking them too indistinctly.29
Judge Hand was obviously concerned with establishing a copyright
analysis for fictional characters that protected original expression yet left
the ideas embodied in characters to the public domain. The distinct
delineation standard is an attempt to strike this balance, resting upon the
assumption that “the more developed a character is, the more it embodies

24
Id. at 1296 (finding, for the first time, the James Bond character to be a proper subject of
copyright protection).
25
Id. at 1297, 1299 (finding the defendant’s work to be substantially similar to the protectable
James Bond character).
26
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
27
Id. at 120, 122.
28
Id. at 121.
29
Id.
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30

expression and less a general idea.” Judge Hand ultimately found that the
characters of Abie’s Irish Rose were not sufficiently delineated to merit
copyright protection.31 As a result, the threshold of “distinct delineation”
that would be required to provide copyright protection to fictional
characters in the future remained undefined.
In Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, the Second Circuit
struggled to define the degree of delineation necessary to meet the “distinct
delineation” threshold.32 Detective Comics sued Bruns Publications for
infringement of the fictional character Superman.33 The court reasoned
that so long as “the pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of
‘Superman’ are not a mere delineation of a benevolent Hercules, but
embody an arrangement of incidents and literary expressions original with
the author, they are proper subjects of copyright and susceptible to
infringement.”34 Finding Superman to embody such original expression,
and therefore to be a proper subject of copyright protection under the
distinct delineation standard, the court went on to the second prong of the
infringement analysis, evaluating the similarity between Superman and the
allegedly infringing character, Wonderman.35 The court determined that
Wonderman was infringing, as it was “plain that the defendants have used
more than general types and ideas and have appropriated the pictorial and
literary details embodied in the complainant’s copyrights.”36
The Detective Comics court was additionally concerned that providing
an inappropriate level of protection, once a valid copyright had been
established, would unnecessarily “limit the raw materials available to
authors in the public domain.”37 The district court had granted an
injunction forbidding the publication of Wonderman in any form that
would “trespass in any respect” on the Superman character.38 The Second
Circuit found that such a sweeping injunction would improperly entitle the
plaintiffs to a monopoly on any character who was “a blessing to
mankind,” and therefore the court limited the injunction to prohibit only
the use of “feats of strength or powers performed by ‘Superman’ or
closely imitating his costume or appearance . . . .”39 Thus, even where a
character is found to be a proper subject of copyright and infringement is
30

Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters that Constitute the Story Being
Told: Who are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection, 8 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 365, 370 (2006).
31
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121–22.
32
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940).
33
Id. at 433.
34
Id. at 433–34.
35
Id. at 433.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 434.
38
Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D.C.N.Y. 1939), rev’d,
111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
39
Detective Comics, 111 F.2d at 434.
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established, the pursuing injunction must be limited to the original
expressions of the author if the ideas underlying the character are to remain
in the public domain.
While Detective Comics involved a relatively straightforward
application of the distinct delineation standard, it still presents many of the
complexities and uncertainties inherent in the analysis. Detective Comics
illustrates that there is no precise mechanism for deciding when a
character, particularly a literary character, has reached the threshold of
distinct delineation. It also illustrates the difficulties attendant to designing
and enforcing an injunction.
B. The Story Being Told Test
Perhaps out of frustration with the ambiguity inherent in the Nichols
distinct delineation standard, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own standard
for analyzing the copyrightability of fictional characters—the story being
told test.40 In Warner Brothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Hammett, the author of The Maltese Falcon, assigned to Warner Brothers
the exclusive right to the writings of The Maltese Falcon.41 Later,
Hammett assigned the exclusive right to the characters of The Maltese
Falcon, including Detective Sam Spade, to CBS.42 Warner Brothers
subsequently sued CBS, believing that its exclusive right to the writings of
The Maltese Falcon included the exclusive right to the Detective Sam
Spade character.43
In analyzing whether fictional characters could be proper subjects of
copyright protection, the Ninth Circuit found it “conceivable that the
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
the protection afforded by copyright.”44 Detective Sam Spade was not
found to constitute the “story being told,” and therefore was not subject to
copyright protection and had not been assigned to Warner Brothers.45 The
court emphasized that “[t]he characters were vehicles for the story told,
and the vehicles did not go with the sale of the story.”46 As such, the use
of the Sam Spade character by CBS did not infringe Warner Brothers’
exclusive right to the writings of The Maltese Falcon.47
The Warner Brothers “story being told” test is often criticized.
40
Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers: Setting a New Standard for Character
Copyrightability, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 341, 347 (2001).
41
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1954).
42
Id. at 948.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 950 (emphasis added).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 950–51.
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Nimmer describes the test as “much too restrictive . . . seeming to envisage
a story devoid of plot, wherein character study constitutes all or
substantially all of the work.”48 Other scholars have noted that
“[i]ronically, while the rule articulated in [Warner Brothers] protected
Hammett’s right to reuse his characters, the rule potentially relegated all
fictional characters to the public domain.”49 Presumably as a result of this
potential to eliminate copyright protection for the vast majority of fictional
characters, the “story being told” test has never been generally accepted.
The Ninth Circuit itself has backed away from a strict application of the
test, limiting it in certain instances and failing to apply it in others.50
Numerous courts have declined to adopt the “story being told” test,
describing it as mere dicta,51 while others have significantly distorted its
meaning.52 Even more, some courts have expressed such uncertainty as to
the state of the law that they analyze the copyrightability of fictional
characters under both the “story being told” test and the “distinct
delineation” standard to avoid reversal.53
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit significantly limited the scope of the “story
being told” test in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.54 Walt Disney
sued Air Pirates claiming that its use of Disney characters in underground
“counter-culture” magazines constituted copyright infringement.55 Air
Pirates argued that fictional characters are “never copyrightable and
therefore cannot in any way constitute a copyrightable component part”
subject to separate copyright protection.56 The Ninth Circuit addressed
these infringement arguments by reviewing its own decision in Warner
Brothers, acknowledging that Warner Brothers “lends some support to the
48

NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 9.12.
David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990).
50
See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (describing the
story being told test as “arguably dicta” yet declining to decide the continuing validity of the test,
finding that regardless of the outcome, lightly sketched characters could form the basis of an
infringement action); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (“Subsequent
decisions in the Ninth Circuit cast doubt on the reasoning and implicitly limit the holding of the Sam
Spade case.”).
51
See Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding the
story being told test to constitute mere dicta, adding that “such a conclusion would be clearly untenable
from the standpoint of public policy, for it would effectively permit the unrestrained pilfering of
characters”).
52
Zecevic, supra note 30, at 372.
53
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (“[I]t behooves this Court to analyze James Bond’s status under the Sam Spade/Olson/Ninth
Circuit ‘story being told’ test, as well as under the Air Pirates/Second Circuit ‘character delineation
test.’”); Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166 (“[O]ut of an abundance of caution this Court will determine
the protectability of the Rocky characters under both tests.”). The Anderson court ultimately held that
the characters of the Rocky movies constituted the story being told and were sufficiently delineated to
warrant copyright protection. Id. at 1166–67.
54
Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 755.
55
Id. at 752.
56
Id. at 754.
49
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57

position that characters ordinarily are not copyrightable.” The court then
turned to a brief discussion of the “distinct delineation” standard developed
by the Second Circuit.58 In the end, the court held that where an author
adds a visual image, the difficulties associated with creating a distinctly
delineated character are reduced, and therefore the story being told test is
unnecessary for visually depicted characters.59 Yet, despite reviewing the
distinct delineation standard and recognizing a new standard for visually
depicted characters, the Ninth Circuit failed to specifically address the
continuing validity of the “story being told” test for literary characters.60
In Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., the Ninth Circuit attempted to
address the impact of the Air Pirates decision on the traditional “story
being told” test.61 The Olson case involved allegations that the characters
of the NBC television series, The A-Team, infringed upon Olson’s
copyright in the characters of a pilot television script, Cargo.62 The court
recognized that “cases subsequent to Warner Brothers have allowed
copyright protection for characters who are especially distinctive,” citing
Air Pirates, and reaffirming the distinction between visually depicted
characters and purely literary characters.63 Nonetheless, the court
explicitly declined the opportunity to “resolve the issue left open in Air
Pirates [as to] whether the Warner Bros. statements should be considered
dicta.”64 Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not go so far as to overrule Warner
Brothers or to adopt the distinct delineation standard, instead referring to
the distinct delineation standard as merely one of the “more lenient
standards adopted elsewhere,” and eventually holding that the characters of
Cargo failed to qualify for protection under either the “story being told”
test or the “distinct delineation” standard.65
Notwithstanding Olson’s discussion of Air Pirates and the distinct
delineation standard, subsequent courts have found that Olson “did little to
clarify Air Pirates’ impact on the [story being told] test.”66 One district
court found “[t]he precise legal standard this Court should apply in
determining when a character may be afforded copyright protection [to be]
fraught with uncertainty,”67 and interpreted Olson as an “implicit
57

Id. at 755.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Feldman, supra note 49, at 694; see also NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 (suggesting that Air
Pirates limited the Sam Spade test to the realm of “word portraits” of literary characters).
61
Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988).
62
Id. at 1447–48.
63
Id. at 1452.
64
Id. at 1452 n.7.
65
Id. at 1452–53.
66
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
67
Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
58
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acknowledgment of the unsettled state of the law.” As a result of this
uncertainty, courts following Ninth Circuit precedent have generally
proceeded to analyze fictional character copyright claims under the Ninth
Circuit’s Warner Brothers/Olson “story being told” test, as well as the
Second Circuit’s Nichols “distinct delineation” standard.69
More recently, in Gaiman v. McFarlane, Judge Posner pronounced
that the Warner Brothers decision was “wrong,” and that the “Ninth
Circuit had killed the decision” with Olson and Air Pirates.70 Gaiman
brought suit seeking a declaration that he jointly owned copyrights in the
characters of the comic book Spawn, including Cogliostro and Medieval
Spawn.71 While McFarlane had created the first, unsuccessful issues of
Spawn, Gaiman had developed the storyline and created the Cogliostro and
Medieval Spawn characters in later, more successful issues.72 McFarlane
argued that the characters were mere “scenes a fair” and thus too
commonplace to be proper subjects of copyright and jointly owned by
Gaiman.73 Judge Posner analyzed the copyrightability of the fictional
characters under a standard reminiscent of Nichols, finding that where a
character has a specific name and a specific appearance “[n]o more is
required for a character copyright.”74 Under this standard, both Cogliostro
and Medieval Spawn were proper subjects of copyright protection.
Gaiman thereby lends support to Nimmer’s theory that “although there is
some conflict in the cases, it is clearly the prevailing view that visual
characters are per se entitled to copyright protection.”75 Gaiman is also
illustrative of both the recent trend away from the story being told test and
the general, unsettled nature of copyright law with regards to fictional
characters.
C. Visually Depicted Characters
Visually depicted characters have had a considerably smoother road to
copyright protection than their purely literary counterparts.76 The presence
of a visual image removes many of the concerns courts have expressed
68

Id. at 1166.
Id.
70
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004).
71
Id. at 648, 651.
72
Id. at 649, 651.
73
Id. at 659.
74
Id. at 660 (recognizing that even if the Warner Brothers decision was correct and binding
authority in the Seventh Circuit it would not apply in this case because there is a real “difference
between literary and graphic expression”).
75
NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12. However, Nimmer also recognized that purely literary
characters may not be entitled to copyright protection per se, instead requiring a more detailed analysis
to determine copyrightablility. Id.
76
See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding copyright
protection for the visual representation of the Superman character).
69
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when evaluating more intangible literary characters. A visual image
provides the court with a concrete representation of the character, thereby
avoiding the difficult task of delving into the work of authorship and
defining the character for purposes of legal analysis.77 A visual image
also provides the court with a defined starting point for evaluating
substantial similarity. Taken together, these significant advantages result
in courts generally accepting that the visual representation of a character is
per se entitled to copyright protection.78
Historically, the protection afforded to visually depicted characters has
been limited by strict requirements for copyrightability.79 In 1914, the
Southern District of New York recognized the copyrightability of cartoon
characters in Hill v. Whalen & Martell.80 In Hill, the creator of the
characters Mutt and Jeff sued the defendant for use of the characters Nutt
and Giff in a stage production entitled, In Cartoonland. 81 To sustain a
finding of copyright infringement, the court noted that Nutt and Giff “were
Mutt and Jeff,” as the defendant’s characters presented similar appearances
and speech and were recognized by the audience as the plaintiff’s
characters.82
While cases such as Hill reinforced the general idea that a cartoon
character may be a proper subject of copyright protection, these early cases
failed to answer a number of significant questions, including whether a
cartoon character could be protected apart from its original work and if
visual similarity alone, in the absence of characterization or elements of the
plot, would be sufficient to sustain a claim of infringement.83 As fictional
characters are “agile creatures” with an ability to exist in different forms
and in different works, the answers to these questions are vitally important
to defining the scope of protection available to visually depicted
characters.84
As early as the 1930’s, courts began to consider whether copyright
protection might be extended to the use of a character apart from any
aspect of the plot of the original work in which the character first appeared.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures, the court suggested that copying a
character outside of the “plot proper” might be sufficient to establish
77

Leslie A. Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor: When Characters Outlive Their Copyrights, 11 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437, 438–39 (1994).
78
See NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12.
79
Kurtz, supra note 21, at 440–41.
80
Hill v. Whalen & Martell Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
81
Id. at 359–60.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
copyright infringement could exist where only the visual images of Batman, Green Arrow and the
Batman insignia were appropriated); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753, 755 (9th
Cir. 1978) (protecting visual images of Disney characters in the absence of any characterization or plot
elements).
84
Kurtz, supra note 77, at 437.
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85

copyright infringement. However, the Nichols court declined to decide
the issue, instead noting that the issue was not properly before the court.86
Over thirty years later, in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the issue
was properly before the court when Air Pirates admitted to directly
copying the images of Disney’s characters without copying any
characterization or plot from the original Disney works.87 The Ninth
Circuit held that the copying of graphic images alone was sufficient to
establish copyright infringement. Specifically, the court noted, “it is plain
that copying a comic book character’s graphic image constitutes copying to
an extent sufficient to justify a finding of infringement.” 88 Thus, copyright
infringement may be established where the visual image alone is
appropriated.89
When the visual depiction of a character is not directly copied, courts
are forced to engage in a more nuanced substantial similarity analysis,
comparing the characters at issue “as they appear in their totality.”90 The
potential complexity of this analysis is well illustrated in United Artists v.
Ford Motor Co., where the court was forced to compare numerous aspects
of animated feline characters.91 United alleged that Ford’s use of an
animated feline character in its television ad campaign infringed United’s
copyrights in the motion pictures, The Pink Panther and The Return of the
Pink Panther.92 Recognizing that the visual images of the animated
characters were not identical, the court announced that it was “not limited”
to analyzing physical characteristics.93 Instead, in addition to their
physical characteristics, the court compared the characters’ actions,
movements, colors, and the music that accompanied the characters, finding
that Ford’s character was not infringing.94
85
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nor need we hold that
the same may not be true as to the characters, quite independently of the ‘plot’ proper, though as far as
we know such as case has never arisen.”).
86
Id.
87
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1978).
88
Id. at 756.
89
Infringement has been found where the visual images of characters, wholly separate from any
plot elements or characterizations, were reproduced in three-dimensional dolls of Raggedy Ann and
Andy, Betty Boop, Sparky, and the Peanut characters. Gruelle v. Molly-‘Es Doll Outfitters, Inc., 94
F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1937) (Raggedy Ann and Andy); Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.,
73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) (Betty Boop); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538
(2d Cir. 1924) (Sparky); United Feature Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D.
Fla. 1983) (the Peanuts characters); see also Kurtz, supra note 21, at 450. (“[I]f the original aspects of
visual expression are closely copied that should be sufficient for a finding of infringement, even if the
two characters behave very differently.”).
90
United Artists Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F. Supp. 89, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
91
Id.; see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1940).
92
United Artists Corp., 483 F. Supp. at 95.
93
Id. at 95.
94
Id. at 93–95.
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This same approach was adopted in Warner Brothers Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co.95 Warner Brothers owned the copyrights in various
works embodying the Superman character.96 Warner Brothers alleged that
Ralph Hinkley, the main character in ABC’s television series, The Greatest
American Hero, was substantially similar to the protectable expression of
Superman.97 The court examined “the total perception of the Hinkley
character” in finding that Hinkley was not substantially similar to
Superman and therefore not infringing.98 In so holding, American
Broadcasting reaffirmed that courts may consider “not only the visual
resemblance but also the totality of the characters’ attributes and traits.”99
These cases thus provide strong support for the proposition that copying of
a character, short of exact duplication and without copying elements of the
plot proper, may still result in a finding of copyright infringement, as
courts are not limited to analyzing any single aspect of the characters at
issue.
D. Derivative Works Doctrine
When the copyright term expires, a fictional character enters into the
public domain and copyright law no longer restricts the public’s use of the
character.100 However, when a fictional character is used in subsequent
works that remain protected by copyright law, the extent to which a
character is available to the domain is often unclear. In accordance with
the derivative works doctrine, courts have routinely held that the public
may use the character as it appeared in works that are no longer subject to
copyright protection. 101 The public may not, however, use the character
traits that are developed in subsequent works and remain subject to
copyright protection.102 This same concept applies to fictional characters
when they appear in different media.103
The standard for analyzing fictional characters in derivative works was
developed in litigation over the Amos ‘n’ Andy characters.104 In Silverman
95

Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236, 240.
98
Id. at 243.
Superman looks and acts like a brave, proud hero, who has dedicated his life to
combating the forces of evil. Hinkley looks and acts like a timid, reluctant hero who
accepts his mission grudgingly and prefers to get on with his normal life . . . . In the
genre of superheros [sic], Hinkley follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives,
Inspector Clouseau follows Sherlock Holmes.
96
97

Id.

99

Id. at 241.
NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 n.20.1.
101
17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
102
NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 n.20.1.
103
Id.
104
Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1989).
100
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v. CBS Inc., a playwright sought a declaratory judgment stating that the
Amos ‘n’ Andy radio programs were in the public domain and thus the
Amos ‘n’ Andy characters could be freely used in his plays.105 The question
arose when the holder of the copyrights to the pre-1948 radio programs
and scripts failed to renew the copyright registrations, placing those
programs and scripts into the public domain.106 At the same time, CBS had
properly maintained its copyright in the post-1948 Amos ‘n’ Andy
television programs and scripts, preserving copyright protection for all of
the televised works.107 The Second Circuit held that “copyrights in
derivative works secure protection only for the incremental additions of
originality contributed by the authors of the derivative works.”108 As a
result, the CBS copyrights would “provide protection only for the
increments of expression beyond what is contained in the pre-1948 radio
scripts.”109
A similar analysis was undertaken more recently in Harvey Cartoons
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries.110 In this case, the original comic
books containing the character Fatso, a member of Casper’s Ghostly Trio,
fell into the public domain, while more recent derivative works remained
subject to copyright protection.111 The court found that “a derivative
copyright is good copyright only with regard to the original
embellishments and additions it has made in the underlying work.”112
Finding that Fatso had not changed “to any appreciable degree” in
derivative works, the court concluded that the Fatso character was entirely
a part of the public domain.113 In other situations, courts have found some
degree of derivative copyright protection for characters such as Conan and
He-Man.114 Yet even where protection is found, the analysis remains
tightly focused on limiting protection to incremental additions of
originality found in those derivative works still subject to copyright

105

Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
109
Id. at 50 (emphasis added) (“It is, of course, likely that the visual portrayal of the characters
added something beyond the delineation contained in the public domain radio scripts, but surely not
every visual aspect is protected.”). The court went on to note that Silverman was free to use the race of
the characters in his musical since that was described in the original script, as well as “any other
physical features adequately described in the pre-1948 radio scripts . . . even though those
characteristics are visually apparent in the television films or tapes.” Id. at 50.
110
Harvey Cartoons Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
111
Id. at 1569.
112
Id. at 1570.
113
Id.
114
Conan Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring a
derivative work to “contain ‘non-trivial’ original aspects distinct from . . . the underlying work in the
public domain”).
106
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115

protection.

E. The Necessity of a Two-Part Inquiry
The level of copyright protection available to fictional characters has
dramatically expanded as fictional characters have moved into new media
and reached unprecedented levels of recognition and value. From sequels
to merchandizing, fictional characters are valuable assets with a
remarkable ability to generate revenue.116 As a threshold issue, courts still
evaluate the copyrightability of the allegedly infringed fictional character
before engaging in a substantial similarity analysis.117 Perhaps because
fictional characters are not expressly included as statutory subject matter,
perhaps because courts are fearful of protecting ideas along with
expression, or perhaps because courts find “[t]he description of a character
in prose leaves much to the imagination,” an independent determination
that a character is the proper subject of copyright protection remains a
prerequisite to a finding of copyright infringement.118 Whether the
analysis occurs under the standards outlined in Nichols, Warner Brothers,
Air Pirates or some combination thereof, it remains an essential aspect of
the copyright infringement analysis for fictional characters.
Some scholars argue that the initial focus on copyrightability
improperly shifts the court’s attention away from “comparing the
characters in the allegedly infringed and infringing work, to analyzing
whether a character is sufficiently distinctive or well-developed to deserve
protection.”119 These scholars contend that “[m]uch of the confusion and
lack of clarity in the standards used to protect fictional characters under
copyright can be avoided by recognizing that the ‘copyrightability’ of a
fictional character, whether literary, pictorial or audiovisual, is not the
issue.”120 Instead, the issue is substantial similarity.121 Yet, these same
scholars acknowledge that “the degree of similarity which will be
considered substantial is one of the most uncertain questions in copyright
and ‘one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations’.”122
Thus, the initial focus on copyrightability is an appropriate and necessary
mechanism for respecting the idea/expression dichotomy, a task that
115
Id. at 359 (“Yet even a derivative work must be ‘original’ to warrant copyright protection, and
although originality ‘need not be inventions in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingenious our novelty,’
. . . a derivative work must ‘contain some substantial, not merely trivial originality’.”).
116
See Walker, supra note 6, at 1D.
117
See e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In order to establish
copyright infringement a plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright and copying by the
defendant.”).
118
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004).
119
Kurtz, supra note 77, at 440.
120
Id. at 472.
121
Id.
122
Id.
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cannot be accomplished by the substantial similarity analysis alone.
If courts were permitted to begin the infringement analysis with the
“most uncertain question[] in copyright law,” substantial similarity, the
risk of over-protecting fictional characters would be significant,
particularly with respect to literary characters.123 Consider, for example, a
minor character in a mystery novel. This character is the intelligent, shy
sidekick of the novel’s hero, a charming detective. The author of this
mystery novel brings an infringement action against a television studio
running a new mystery series featuring a charming detective with a shy
sidekick. One court begins the infringement analysis by first analyzing
whether the sidekick character is an appropriate subject of copyright
protection. This court dismisses the case, finding the sidekick to be
nothing more than a stock character, commonplace in detective stories, and
inadequately defined to warrant copyright protection. A second court
begins the infringement analysis by examining the substantial similarity of
the characters. This court undertakes a rigorous comparison, examining
numerous attributes of each character, finding that both characters wore
glasses, tended to uncover important clues, had a shy disposition, and were
approximately the same age. Distracted by the similarity of these low
levels of abstraction, the second court finds the similarity to be substantial
and the television series therefore infringing. In the end, the second court
has incorrectly provided copyright protection to a stock character, present
in nearly every mystery novel or television show because the larger
question, the copyrightability of the original character, was not adequately
addressed. Thus, the uncertainty of the substantial similarity analysis
combined with the complexity of protecting fictional characters, require
that courts first determine if a character is a proper subject for copyright
protection. If such an analysis is not conducted, the extension of copyright
protection to ill-defined characters representing little more than vague
ideas and generalities will be commonplace.124
In sum, evaluating whether a fictional character is a proper subject for
copyright protection is an unavoidable threshold issue in the copyright
infringement analysis. While the standard has at times been too restrictive,
the most restrictive line of cases has essentially been overruled.125
Currently, where characters are visually depicted, courts routinely and
123

Id.
In many respects, the threshold analysis of copyrightability is reminiscent of other intellectual
property regimes. In patent law for example, an invention may meet the standards of novelty,
usefulness and nonobviousness, yet where it does not meet the threshold requirement of embodying
statutory subject matter, it is not patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2000). In trademark law, a
finding of non-functionality is a prerequisite to trademark protection. If a trade dress fails to meet the
non-functionality requirement, trademark protection is unavailable. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001).
125
See supra Part II.B.
124
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appropriately find that they are per se entitled to copyright protection.126
In cases where characters are purely literary in nature, the analysis is
inherently more complex, as the abstractions created in the minds of
readers are more challenging to quantify than concrete visual images.127
The subject will therefore continue to be a challenging one, as courts must
define intangible, literary characters for the purposes of legal analysis.
Nonetheless, the existence of complexity does not support an argument
that the inquiry should be eliminated altogether, particularly where the
substantial similarity analysis alone fails to ensure that copyright
protection is extended only to original expression.
III. TRADEMARK PROTECTION
Trademark and unfair competition laws provide fictional characters
with a second form of intellectual property protection that is dramatically
different from the protection available under copyright law. Copyright law
seeks to protect the original writings of an author and is mainly concerned
with a character’s development and individualization as a threshold for
protection.128 Trademark and unfair competition laws seek to protect the
commercial value of trademarks, and are mainly concerned with the ability
of a mark to symbolize the source of goods or services as a threshold for
protection.129 Trademarks “are designed to guard consumers against
confusion as to the source or authorization of an item connected to a
trademark.”130 Such protection provides consistency, allowing consumers
to rely on the information conveyed by the mark, thereby significantly
reducing consumer search costs and encouraging manufactures to invest in
the creation of quality products and consumer goodwill.131 A trademark
owner is thus provided with a limited monopoly over the use of the mark in
connection with those goods and services for which the mark has the
ability to serve as an indication of source.132 Trademark protection exists
so long as a mark retains its source-identifying capacity, and may therefore
persist in perpetuity.133
Trademark and unfair competition laws offer intellectual property
protection to fictional characters at both the state and federal level. The
Lanham Act provides the basis for federal trademark protection and
126

See supra notes 70–94 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A, B.
128
Kurtz, supra note 21, at 444–53 (quoting Judge Hand: “the less developed the characters, the
less they can be copyrighted”).
129
15 U.S.C § 1125 (2006).
130
Christine Nickels, The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property Protections When a Character
Enters the Public Domain, UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133, 155 (1999).
131
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
132
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
133
Id. § 1058 (2006).
127
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defines a trademark as, “any word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof used . . . to identify and distinguish . . . goods . . . from
those [of] others and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”134
Numerous state unfair competition laws also provide protection to fictional
characters,135 and the critical legal issue at both the state and federal level
is whether the contested use of a mark is likely to cause confusion as to the
“origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods, services, or commercial
activities . . . . ”136 In the absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion,
trademark infringement will not be found.137 However, in 1995, the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act removed the requirement of likelihood of
confusion for a subset of marks found to be “famous.”138 This legislation
substantially increased the protection available to famous marks and
created an area of trademark law where the protection of fictional
characters may well be overextended.
A. Acquiring Distinctiveness
In order to qualify as a trademark under the Lanham Act, a mark must
be able to identify and distinguish goods or services from those goods or
services provided by others.139 To satisfy this requirement, a mark must be
“distinctive.”140 Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired through
prior use of the mark establishing secondary meaning.141 Secondary
meaning is established when an otherwise indistinctive mark has “become
distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce” through the applicant’s
use of the mark, creating public recognition that the particular mark is
associated with the applicant.142
Recently, courts have begun to impose more stringent distinctiveness
requirements for certain classes of trademarks. In 2000, the Supreme
Court held that where consumers are not “predisposed to regard
[particular] symbols as [an] indication of the producer . . . inherent
134
Id. § 1127. Federal trademark protection is available for both registered and unregistered
marks; however there are greater remedies available for registered marks. See Id. § 1114 (2006)
(outlining remedies that are limited to registered trademarks).
135
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.7
(1992).
136
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995), amended by Id. § 1125(c) (2006).
137
Id. § 1125 (2006).
138
Id. § 1125(e).
139
Id. § 1127.
140
Id. § 1052.
141
Id. § 1052(f).
142
Id.; see, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1983) (“The concept of secondary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary and primary
meaning of their own ‘may be long use with a particular product, come to be known by the public as
specifically designating that product’.”). A finding of secondary meaning in the New Orleans area for
Zatarains’ descriptive term ‘Fish-Fri’ was upheld after extensive consumer surveys were conducted.
Id. at 795–96.
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distinctiveness will not be found.”
Both color marks and product
design145 have been found to lack this predisposition, thus requiring a
showing of secondary meaning to obtain trademark protection. Achieving
distinctiveness through secondary meaning, unlike inherent distinctiveness,
requires actual use of the mark for a period of time sufficient to create
public recognition. Therefore, establishing acquired distinctiveness both
delays the implementation of trademark protection and places a heavy
evidentiary burden on the party seeking to gain trademark rights.
In the realm of fictional characters there has yet to be a case where the
court expressly denied the possibility of inherent distinctiveness.
However, not a single court has found a fictional character to be inherently
distinctive.146 Instead, courts have routinely required a showing of
secondary meaning, limiting trademark protection to those fictional
characters that have undergone a reasonable degree of circulation and
established some level of public recognition. In Fisher v. Star Co., the
New York Court of Appeals found that the Mutt and Jeff cartoon
characters had been “published and became well known as distinct
characters.”147 In reasoning that the characters were entitled to protection,
the court noted that “[t]he figures and names have been so connected with
the respondent as their originator or author that the use by another of new
cartoons exploiting the characters ‘Mutt and Jeff’ would be unfair to the
public and to the plaintiff.”148 While the court ultimately decided the case
on state unfair competition grounds, Fisher established the framework for
analyzing the acquired distinctiveness of fictional characters.
In more recent cases, courts have continued to evaluate the
distinctiveness of fictional characters under a standard similar to that
discussed in Fisher.149 In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the
publisher of the Peter Rabbit book series sought trademark protection for
eight character illustrations.150 While the court accepted that the
illustrations were “capable of distinguishing Warne’s books from those of
others,” it rejected the possibility that the illustrations could be inherently
distinctive.151 Remanding the case, the court placed the burden on the
143

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2000).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 163, 166 (1995) (holding that color marks do
not constitute inherently distinctive marks).
145
See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 216 (holding that product design is not inherently
distinctive).
146
Nickles, supra note 130, at 160.
147
Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 431 (1921).
148
Id. at 432.
149
Id. (requiring that fictional characters are well-known as distinct characters to achieve
acquired distinctiveness).
150
Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
151
Id. at 1195 (“[I]t cannot be said that they are so arbitrary, unique and non-descriptive as to
constitute ‘technical trademarks’ which are presumed valid as soon as they are affixed to the goods and
the goods are sold.”).
144
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publisher to establish that these illustrations had acquired distinctiveness in
the eyes of the consuming public.152 In M’Otto Enterprises v. Redsand
Inc., M’Otto sought a declaratory judgment that its caricature of a
volleyball player did not infringe Redsand’s caricature.153 Redsand’s mark
was a registered trademark, creating a strong presumption of validity, yet
the court reasoned that even in the absence of registration, the caricature
would be “distinctive based upon[] widespread use and recognition.”154
By consistently requiring a showing of acquired distinctiveness, courts
have effectively eliminated the argument that a fictional character can ever
be inherently distinctive. As a result, the proponent of a trademark must
satisfy the heavy evidentiary burden of acquired distinctiveness through
widespread use and recognition. Even so, it should be noted that this
burden serves as an important mechanism for evaluating the
appropriateness of trademark protection, forcing courts to examine the
ability of a fictional character to serve actually as an indicator of source
rather than permitting a conclusory finding of inherent distinctiveness.
Thus, the acquired distinctiveness analysis helps to ensure that trademark
protection does not restrict the creative use of fictional characters beyond
the extent necessary to protect a character’s source identifying capacity.
B. Single Source Identification
When a fictional character acquires distinctiveness, that character is
able to fulfill the statutory requirement of identifying and distinguishing
However, another important statutory requirement often
goods.155
prohibits even a distinctive character from receiving trademark protection.
The Lanham Act specifically states that a trademark must “indicate the
source of the goods.”156 Courts have interpreted this language to require
that a trademark indicate only a single source of the goods.157 This
presents particular difficulty for fictional characters, as they are often
simultaneously associated with a number of different sources, including
authors,158 producers,159 sponsors160 and even themselves.161 As a result, a
152

Id. at 1196, 1199.
M’Otto Enters., Inc. v. Redsand Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1491, 1492–93 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
154
Id. at 1499.
155
See supra notes 139–54 and accompanying text.
156
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added).
157
Universal Studios v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 923–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
Michael T. Helfand, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual
Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 635–38
(1999) (noting that trademarks operate “to signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from a
single, albeit anonymous, source”); Nickles supra note 130, at 163–64 (noting that courts have
interpreted the statutory requirement that the trademark indicate the source of goods as necessitating a
single source).
158
Gruelle v. Molly-‘Es Doll Outfitters Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 1937) (finding that the
Raggedy Ann doll was associated with the author, John B. Gruelle); Patten v. Superior Talking
153
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“fictional character’s ability to indicate a single source is often no more
than a convenient fiction.”162 Indeed, if a fictional character is unable to
identify a single source, the character is unable to serve the goals of
trademark law.
The concern that fictional characters do not identify a single source is
well illustrated in the case of Frederick Warne Co. v. Book Sales Inc.163 In
this case, the publisher of the original Peter Rabbit book series, Warne,
sought protection for illustrations that were created exclusively for
Warne’s editions of the Peter Rabbit books.164 Warne claimed that the
characters portrayed in the illustrations had “attained a place in the public
esteem comparable to Mickey Mouse, Peter Pan and Raggedy Ann and
Andy.”165 Regardless of the level of esteem the illustrations had achieved,
the court was quick to point out that a particular type of esteem was
required, noting that “it would not be enough that the illustrations in
question have come to signify Beatrix Potter as [the] author of the books;
plaintiff must show that they have come to represent [Warne’s] goodwill
and reputation as [the] publisher of those books.”166 The court went on to
find that if the publisher could “establish a specialized secondary
meaning—that the illustrations represent Warne’s goodwill and reputation
as the source . . . it will have a protectable trademark interest . . . .”167 This
focus on single source identification lead the court to the appropriate
conclusion that trademark protection was not warranted in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the public’s identification of the illustrations with
the publisher.
The single source requirement is particularly relevant where a
character appears in a variety of different media. In Universal City Studios
Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Universal sued the holder of the Donkey Kong
copyright for alleged infringement of the King Kong trademark.168 In
reviewing the complicated facts surrounding ownership of the mark, the
court held that the King Kong trademark lacked the ability to identify a
Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that Frank Merriwell’s character was
associated with the author, Burt L. Standish).
159
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding
an association with the producers and the television show); Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman Inc., 157 F.
Supp. 621, 624–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (finding an association with the producer and the television series).
160
Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760–61 (D. Conn. 1935)
(holding that the Old Maestro character is associated in the public mind with Pabst Blue Ribbon, the
sponsor of the Old Maestro radio program).
161
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus. Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(finding Clark Kent to be associated with Superman).
162
Kurtz, supra note 21, at 485.
163
Frederic Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
164
Id. at 1193.
165
Id. at 1194.
166
Id. at 1195.
167
Id. at 1198.
168
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 911, 913–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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single source.
The existence of various competing property interests in
the mark, including RKO (owner of the original 1933 movie and its
sequel), Cooper (owner of the worldwide book and periodical publishing
rights to King Kong), DDL (owner of the 1976 remake) and the
unauthorized third-party use of King Kong trademarks, made it impossible
for the mark to serve as a single source identifier.170 Universal attempted
to overcome these murky ownership issues by arguing that trademark law
does not require consumers to know exactly which party is the source of a
trademarked product.171 The court acknowledged that this argument was
correct, but emphasized that even so, it did not obviate the “statutory
[requirement] . . . that the mark indicate to consumers a single source of
origin.”172 While the consumer may not have knowledge of the particular
source of the good, the consumer must understand that the good originates
from a single source.
Courts frequently fail to apply the single source requirement in a
rigorous manner. In many instances, courts ignore the issue altogether
despite the propensity of fictional characters to identify a plurality of
sources.173 Overall, single source identification operates in much the same
way as distinctiveness. Both are required for a character to fulfill its
function as a trademark, and in the absence of either, the protection of
fictional characters under trademark law is inappropriate.
C. Protected Elements
Once a fictional character is deemed appropriate for trademark
protection, courts must determine which elements of these often complex
creations are to be protected. Trademark protection has been extended to a
wide range of elements including character names,174 nicknames,175
costumes,176 and even key phrases associated with a character.177
169

Id. at 923–24.
Id.
Id. at 925; see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name,
symbol or device, or any combination thereof . . . [used] to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.”).
172
Universal City Studios, 578 F. Supp. at 925.
173
Kurtz, supra note 77, at 443–44.
174
See Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935)
(finding trademark protection for the Old Maestro character).
175
See Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(finding trademark protection for the nickname Tarz based on public recognition of the name Tarzan
and the likelihood that the use of the nickname Tarz would cause confusion or mistake about the source
of origin of the defendant’s film).
176
See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.
1979) (finding “the combination of the white boots, white shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studded
vest and belt” to be a trademarkable costume).
177
See Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1942) (protecting the phrase “Hi-yo,
Silver, away!”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162, 1164–65 (S.D. Texas
1982) (protecting the phrase “E.T. Phone Home!!”).
170
171
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Nevertheless, courts were historically reluctant to extend trademark
protection to the visual appearance of characters, interpreting such
protection as the province of copyright. In Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll
Outfitters Inc., the court protected the name Raggedy Ann as a trademark,
yet refused to recognize a trademark in the doll itself. Instead, the court
considered copyright to be the proper avenue for such a claim, declining to
enjoin the use of the deceptively similar doll in the absence of a copyright
claim.178 For a period of time following Gruelle, courts continued to
analyze copyright and trademark claims separately, generally limiting
protection of three-dimensional representations to copyright.179
The restrained approach of analyzing copyright and trademark claims
separately soon gave way to a less coherent line of cases that often
commingled trademark and copyright principles.
In Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates, the defendants used the world’s most famous
rodent, Mickey Mouse, in counter-culture comic books of questionable
taste.180 In an effort to overcome the stringent copyright “story being told”
test, the district court emphasized “that the depiction of each character as it
has been developed by the plaintiff has achieved a high degree of
‘recognition’ or ‘identification’.”181 Through the use of these trademark
principles, the district court created copyright protection for Mickey
Mouse.182 While eventually overruled by the Ninth Circuit on other
grounds, the district court’s opinion is indicative of the convoluted
reasoning once employed to protect three-dimensional representations of
characters.
Following a similar line of reasoning as the district court in Air
Pirates, the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v.
McDonald’s Corp. relied on trademark principals to sustain a finding of
copyright infringement.183 Comparing the similarity of the characters at
issue, the court found that the defendant had captured the “total concept
and feel” of the works, sufficient to support a finding of copyright

178

Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll Outfitters Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1937).
See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prod. Div., 443 F. Supp. 291, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[I]nsofar
as the defendants claim that visual similarities between Ideal’s toys and the movie characters create a
misimpression of ‘sponsorship’ by or derivation from ‘Star Wars,’ the Court has already discussed at
some length the similarities between the toys themselves and the movie characters in connection with
the allegation of copyright infringement.”); Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 336, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding the sale of the cartoons included the copyright and therefore the right to
three-dimensional representations of the figures).
180
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
181
Walt Disney Prods., 345 F. Supp. at 113.
182
Id.
183
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir.
1977).
179
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184

infringement.
Moving away from the generally accepted copyright
analysis of substantial similarity, the traditional trademark “look and feel”
test was clearly an improper basis for a finding of copyright
infringement.185 The following year, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Air
Pirates removed the “story being told” restriction for copyright protection
of visually depicted characters and eliminated the need to combine
copyright and trademark principles to sustain protection for threedimensional representations of fictional characters.186
Today, courts generally encounter little difficulty providing trademark
protection to three-dimensional representations of fictional characters
under traditional trademark doctrines. In Warner Brothers v. American
Broadcasting Co., the Second Circuit declared that they “did not doubt that
the image of a cartoon character and some indicia of that character can
function as a trademark to identify the source of a work of
entertainment.”187 In the wake of this opinion, the visual appearances of
fictional characters have been routinely protected, including the visual
appearances of the characters of the Peanuts comic strip,188 Superman and
Wonder Woman,189 and even E.T.190 Thus, courts have come to recognize
the unique ability of fictional characters to serve a source identifying
function.191
D. Likelihood of Confusion
Once an element of a fictional character is recognized as a trademark,
the owner of the trademark must demonstrate that the allegedly infringing
mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or is likely to deceive the
public as to the source or sponsorship of the goods or services.192 In the
184
Id. at 1167, 1169, 1175. (“[T]he combination of many different elements . . . command
copyright protection because of its particular subjective quality.”).
185
Riger K. Zissu, Copyright Luncheon Circle: The Interplay of Copyright and Trademark Law in
the Protection of Character Rights With Observations on Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 453, 455 (2004).
186
Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 755.
187
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983). Nevertheless,
the court held that, as a matter of law, the contested works lacked the substantial similarity necessarily
to create a likelihood of confusion. Id. The Warner Brothers court relied on the earlier opinion of DC
Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates which held that not only the name, but the product itself, in this
case Aquaman, could be trademarked. DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[O]ur reading of the cases in this circuit shows that where the product sold by
plaintiff is ‘entertainment’ in one form or another, then not only the advertising of the product but also
an ingredient of the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 43(a) because the
ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in the public mind.”).
188
United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
189
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
190
Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 679, 683–84 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
191
For example, in 1988, the licensing of the characters in the movie Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtles netted over $175 million dollars. In 1989, licensing fees reached $350 million dollars. That
same year, Batman generated over $251 in licensing fees. Nickles, supra note 130, at 134.
192
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006).
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absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion, a finding of trademark
infringement is an unwarranted limitation on creativity and expression, for
the trademark owner’s rights have not been infringed. The likelihood of
confusion analysis therefore provides courts with another important
mechanism for limiting the scope of trademark protection.
The unauthorized use of characters in new works of fiction often
places the interests of trademark protection and creative expression in
direct competition with one another. Where a character is well known,
courts typically enjoin others from using the character in new works of
Trademark protection is extended to such well-known
fiction.193
characterson the assumption that consumers are likely to believe that the
creators of the first work created, or at the very least, authorized the second
work.194 The fictional character Lone Ranger provides an example of such
a well-known character. In Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, the unlicensed use of
the Lone Ranger character in a circus was enjoined,195 and in Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Curry, the unlicensed use of the Lone Ranger character in rodeo
shows was enjoined.196 In both cases, the courts held that the defendants
were attempting to pass off their show as having an affiliation with Lone
Ranger Inc., resulting in a likelihood that consumers would be confused as
to the source or sponsorship of the shows.197
In DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business the well-known
characters of Superman and Wonder Woman were also protected from
unauthorized use in new works, namely the singing telegram business.198
The court found that the Superman and Wonder Woman characters
constituted distinctive marks by virtue of their “universal recognition,”
“widespread popularity,” and “extensive goodwill.”199 Based on the
marks’ acquired distinctiveness and the similarity of the defendant’s
singing telegram mark, the court found a likelihood of confusion and
granted relief. Evidence of actual consumer confusion served only to
strengthen the decision to enjoin the defendant’s use of the marks.200
In cases where characters are less well known, courts are hesitant to
restrict their use in new works of fiction. This point is well illustrated by
the character of Paladin in De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems.201
Victor DeCosta created a colorful character named Paladin and proceeded
to perform as Paladin at rodeos, horse shows, auctions and parades,
193

See, e.g., Prouty v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265–66 (D. Mass. 1939) (enjoining the
use of the character Stella Dallas in skits created by NBC on a theory of unfair competition).
194
Kurtz supra note 21, at 489.
195
Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 651–52, 654 (4th Cir. 1942).
196
Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190, 191–95 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
197
Cox, 124 F.2d at 652; Currey, 79 F. Supp. at 195.
198
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (D.C. Ga. 1984).
199
Id. at 115.
200
Id. at 116.
201
De Costa v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir. 1975).
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circulating business cards with the logo “Have Gun Will Travel.”202
Nearly a decade after DeCosta began appearing as Paladin, a television
series entitled Have Gun Will Travel, starring a character by the name of
Paladin, dressed in a costume nearly identical to that of DeCosta’s Paladin,
began running on CBS.203 DeCosta sued CBS under theories of trademark
infringement and unfair competition. Denying relief, the court emphasized
that DeCosta’s limited use of the character and the difference in the
respective audiences resulted in little likelihood of confusion as to the
source or sponsorship of the CBS television series.204 This same fate is
often suffered by trademark holders where the alleged infringer’s use of a
character involves less than a complete replica of the original character.205
Courts also decline to extend protection in many cases where the alleged
infringement involves less tangible qualities, such as physical
characteristics and personality.206
The use of fictional characters on commercial products has become a
widespread, lucrative practice. However, the construction of a likelihood
of confusion analysis for commercial products has proven to be more
problematic than the construction of the same analysis for new works of
fiction. The difficulty arises out of a fundamental disagreement regarding
the ability of a fictional character on commercial products to indicate to
consumers the source, or at least the sponsorship, of a given product. This
question is of critical importance because in the absence of such an
association, the character does not serve as a source identifier and there can
be no likelihood of confusion. Thus, much of the litigation surrounding
commercial products has turned on this critical issue.207
In some instances, courts have denied protection where the defendant’s
merchandise failed to create a specific association with the plaintiff,
regardless of the fact that the defendant’s merchandise was more generally
associated with the fictional character at issue. In Toho Co. v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., the producer of the Godzilla movies sought to enjoin Sears
from producing garbage bags under the name “Bagzilla,” displaying a
humorous caricature of a monster with a striking resemblance to
Godzilla.208 The court determined that consumers were likely to associate
202

Id. at 502.
Id.
204
Id. at 514.
205
See Universal City Studios Inc. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding use of the Donkey Kong character was not likely to cause confusion with King Kong and
Universal Studios).
206
See Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to extend
protection to a comedy writer who asserted that his name had acquired secondary meaning as the
originator of a prison rodeo movie concept).
207
See e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
that a garbage bag seller’s use of “Bagzilla” with the slogan “monstrously strong bags” posed no
likelihood of confusing customers as to the source of the bags).
208
Id. at 789–90.
203
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Bagzilla with Godzilla. Nonetheless, this finding was insufficient to
establish trademark infringement as the Bagzilla product posed “no
likelihood of confusing consumers by suggesting that the Sears trash bags
were made, sponsored or endorsed by [the plaintiff].”209 Therefore, under
Toho, the general association of an infringing product with a fictional
character will not result in a finding of trademark infringement in the
absence of a similar association with the trademark owner.210
Other courts have found trademark infringement where the infringing
mark creates an association between the defendant’s products and the
plaintiff’s character yet does not create an association with the particular
plaintiff. In these instances, the likelihood of confusion analysis did not
focus on the ability of the fictional character to invoke a direct association
with the plaintiff. Instead, the courts focused on the defendant’s
exploitation of the general demand for a character created by the
plaintiff.211 In Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc., the creators of the
television series Wyatt Earp were granted a preliminary injunction against
a manufacturer of children’s Wyatt Earp costumes.212 The court found a
likelihood that the public would purchase the merchandise “because of an
identification with the name Wyatt Earp as developed by the plaintiff’s
television program.”213 The court went on to assume, without discussion,
that the character Wyatt Earp would in turn be associated with the
plaintiff.214
In more recent cases, courts have acknowledged that the exploitation
of well-known fictional characters through merchandising agreements has
become almost universal, creating a public expectation that merchandise
displaying elements of a fictional character is at least sponsored by the
owner of the character.215 Some scholars argue that this is a “bootstrap
result,” based on court enforcement of licensing agreements, such that
public perceptions could and should change.216 While this may be a valid
interpretation of the cause of the public perception, it should not change
the outcome of a court’s decision to provide trademark protection. The
cause of a particular public perception is not relevant to the trademark
analysis. It matters not why the public associates the presence of a
character on merchandise with sponsorship or licensing of the
209

Id. at 790.
Id.
211
Kurtz supra note 21, at 498.
212
Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
213
Id. at 625 (internal citations omitted).
214
Id.
215
See, e.g., Conan Props Inc. v. Conans Pizza Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Many of
today’s consumers expect such endorsements and act favorably toward them.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v.
Gay Toys Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or
otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.”).
216
Kurtz, supra note 77, at 445–46.
210
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merchandise, but only that the public does in fact make this association.
Courts have generally supported this concept, particularly where consumer
surveys provided evidence of a general consumer perception that fictional
characters are subject to licensing agreements.217
Trademark protection of fictional characters provides many benefits to
both the consuming public and the trademark owner. Protection reduces
consumer search costs and consumer confusion while at the same time
providing incentives for trademark owners to maintain quality and promote
goodwill. However, when fictional characters fail to provide the public
with the benefit of source identification, a finding of trademark
infringement unnecessarily removes fictional characters from the public
domain. Fortunately, trademark and unfair competition laws provide many
tools to limit protection to appropriate circumstances. Through careful
consideration of acquired distinctiveness, single source identification, and
likelihood of consumer confusion, trademark protection can be confined to
its appropriate scope.
E. Dilution
Dilution provides fictional characters with another powerful form of
trademark protection.218 The theory of dilution is generally traced back to
Frank I. Schechter’s 1927 Harvard Law Review article where he described
dilution as guarding against “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use
upon non-competing goods.”219 Prior to 1995, dilution jurisprudence was a
combination of inconsistent and unsettled state law doctrines that were
largely ignored by federal courts.220 Courts and scholars alike were
concerned that dilution would override copyright law, as well as traditional
trademark protection, by permanently removing certain characters from the
public domain and creating trademark rights in gross.221 Irrespective of
these well-grounded fears, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA) and the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006222
217
See Processed Plastics Co. v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1982)
(involving a consumer survey that indicated confusion between toy cars and the Dukes of Hazzard
television series where the toy cars were a direct replica of the television car); Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving a consumer survey that revealed that eight out of
ten children associated the defendant’s replica of the Dukes of Hazzard car with the actual Dukes of
Hazzard car).
218
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
219
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
220
In 1995, twenty-eight states recognized a theory of dilution. A showing of likelihood of
confusion was required in some states while others required the absence of competition between
parties. Kristen Knudsen, Tomorrow Never Dies, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 13, 17 (2000).
221
Helfand, supra note 157, at 639.
222
The Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act (FTDRA) of 2006 made several important
amendments to the original FTDA. Most importantly, the FTDRA expressly overruled the Supreme
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(FTDRA) have forced courts to recognize dilution as a cause of action on
the federal level.223
Dilution presents a form of trademark protection quite different from
that available under more traditional trademark doctrines.
As a
prerequisite to dilution protection, a mark must be found to be “famous.”224
Once a court makes the difficult and often unpredictable determination that
a mark is famous, dilution provides broad protection in the absence of a
likelihood of consumer confusion, even protecting the use of marks on
non-competing goods.225 While litigation regarding dilution of fictional
characters at the federal level has been sparse, the cases that have been
decided illustrate the potentially sweeping nature of dilution protection. In
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., Danjaq, the assignee of all U.S. film and
television rights in the James Bond character, sought an injunction to halt
Sony’s plan to make a series of James Bond movies.226 The court granted
a broad injunction, prohibiting all use of the James Bond mark by Sony,
finding a likelihood that Sony’s use of the mark in any capacity would
result in dilution by blurring.227 In 1999, the fictional character Arthur, a
cartoon aardvark, was granted similar broad protection in Brown v. It’s
Entertainment Inc., where the court prohibited the use of unlicensed Arthur
costumes for live entertainment and promotional appearances.228 The court
was concerned that “[s]hould unauthorized Arthur impersonators
proliferate . . . the image sought by the plaintiffs for Arthur will be difficult
to control and might easily become blurred or tarnished, resulting in a loss
Court’s decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
432–33 (2003), superseded by statute 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). In Moseley, the Supreme Court
had dismissed the case, requiring a showing of actual dilution to support a finding of dilution. Id. at
434. The FTDRA changed the standard to merely a likelihood of dilution, thereby significantly
decreasing the necessary evidentiary showing. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”). The FTDRA also limited dilution
claims to two categories, dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment, id. § 1125(c)(1) (prohibiting
the “use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment”), removed the possibility niche fame, id. § 1125(c)(2)(A), and clarified the enumerated
exclusions and fair use defenses, id. § 1125(c)(3).
223
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
224
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For the purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree
of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration,
extent and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized
by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the
principal register.”).
225
Id. § 1125(c)(1) (“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition or of actual economic injury”).
226
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1341, 1343–44 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
227
Id. at 1348.
228
Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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of credibility, public affection and consumer interest.”
While dilution is limited to famous marks, these cases are illustrative
of the sweeping protection that may be granted once a mark is found to be
famous. Some commentators believe that federal trademark dilution
“ensures that famous fictional characters will not be pressed into
undignified service or cloned by copiers.”230 Other critics worry that the
“widespread ban on unauthorized use, even if the public is not in danger of
being mislead,” undermines the traditional goals of trademark
protection.231 In the end, federal trademark dilution will likely prove to be
an important mechanism for protecting the source identifying capacity of
some of our culture’s most influential fictional characters. Yet providing
such protection creates a very real possibility that famous characters will
be over-protected by broad injunctions that unnecessarily limit the public’s
use of fictional characters.
In order to confine dilution to an appropriate scope, particular attention
must be paid to the exclusions of the FTDRA, which specifically outline
those acts that “shall not be actionable as dilution.”232 Congress
intentionally strengthened the exclusions in the FTDRA, in part to offset
the lowered evidentiary showing necessary to sustain a dilution claim,
mainly likelihood of dilution in place of actual dilution. Therefore, it is
necessary to respect the weight of these exclusions by carefully analyzing
the nature of the contested use to ensure that the use is in fact actionable.
Consider for example, a hypothetical use of the James Bond character in a
Saturday Night Live skit featuring the aging Pierce Brosnan performing
“James Bond-style” action hero stunts around a retirement community.
While a court would likely find the James Bond character to be famous and
its use in a television skit likely to cause dilution by blurring or even
tarnishment, the fair use exclusion for parodying must be controlling.233
Still in its infancy, the appropriateness of dilution with regard to
fictional characters will turn on the courts’ ability to develop a consistent
jurisprudence that calibrates the standard for determining when a mark is
“famous” at an appropriate level of recognition and provides adequate
229

Id. at 859.
Knudsen, supra note 220, at 19.
231
Vincent N. Palladino, Reigning in Trademark Dilution Claims, 1 N.Y.L.J. 1, 8 (1999).
232
15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(3) (2006) (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive
fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation
of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with—(i) advertising or
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and parodying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner. (B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. (C) Any noncommercial use of a
mark.”).
233
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (“identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner”).
230

2009]

PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

953

234

strength to the enumerated exclusions.

IV. DUAL PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK
Analyzing the intellectual property protection available to fictional
characters becomes considerably more complicated when a character is the
subject of both trademark and copyright protection. There is a real concern
that dual protection will “stifl[e] the very creative forces copyright is
supposed to nurture” by limiting the material available to future authors.235
At the same time, there is recognition that the nature of the rights conferred
by copyright and trademark are substantially different, and therefore
capable of co-existing where properly granted.236 While the majority of the
issues surrounding dual copyright and trademark protection of fictional
characters have yet to be resolved or even addressed in a meaningful way
by the courts, the limited jurisprudence available does provide both
important insights into how courts may address these issues in the future
and important mechanisms for determining the appropriate scope of dual
protection.
A. Concurrent Copyright and Trademark Protection
The life cycle of the intellectual property protection of fictional
characters can be broken down into two distinct stages. The first stage
involves concurrent copyright and trademark protection, while the second
stage involves trademark protection persisting after the expiration of the
copyright term. Of major concern in the first stage is the potential for
concurrent trademark protection to improperly limit copyright fair use.
Copyright fair use is a carefully crafted doctrine that endeavors to provide
an appropriate offsetting balance to the limited monopoly granted under
copyright.237 Copyright fair use was not developed with an expectation of
concurrent trademark protection. Thus, the addition of trademark
protection can be quite disruptive to this already complicated and
unpredictable doctrine, as seen in Original Appalachia Artworks Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.238 Topps Chewing Gum manufactured
“Garbage Pail Kids” trading cards and stickers depicting dolls with
features “similar to Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in rude, violent and
frequently noxious settings.”239 Topps claimed that the Garbage Pail Kids
234
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were a parody of the Cabbage Patch Kids, and therefore protected by
copyright fair use.240 Dismissing the fair use defense, the court went
through the motions of evaluating the statutory fair use factors, yet focused
almost entirely on the economic value and goodwill associated with the
Cabbage Patch Kids trademarks,241 erroneously importing trademark
principles into the copyright fair use analysis.
The Appalachia case also illustrates another important problem that
arises with concurrent copyright and trademark protection. Had the
Appalachia court determined that the defendant’s use of the Garbage Pail
Kids constituted permissible fair use under copyright, an injunction would
nevertheless have been issued based on the court’s finding of trademark
infringement.242 Thus, trademark protection of the Garbage Pail Kids
would eliminate otherwise permissible copyright fair use.243 In other cases,
courts have made sophisticated inquiries into the defendant’s particular use
of the trademark in finding copyright fair use despite the existence of
trademark protection.244 Such in-depth inquiries, while preferable, have
been rare. In the end, concurrent trademark protection may eliminate, or at
the very least curtail otherwise permissible copyright fair use. Such a
limitation is acceptable in light of the public benefits associated with
trademarks. However, the ability of trademarks to significantly limit the
copyright fair use doctrine only underscores the importance of ensuring
that trademark protection for fictional characters is properly granted from
the outset.
B. Trademark Protection and the Public Domain
The second stage in the life cycle of a fictional character’s intellectual
property protection begins when the copyright term expires and trademark
protection persists. This stage presents a variety of important issues as the
use of a fictional character otherwise in the public domain under copyright
law is indefinitely restricted by trademark protection. The quid pro quo of
copyright is often described as the right to copy precisely those works
whose creation was incentivized by the granting of a limited copyright
monopoly. Yet the addition of trademark protection makes such public
240
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domain works potentially unavailable. Many scholars argue that “[w]hen
copyright law relegates a character that functions as a trademark into the
public domain, the public should be able to employ the character.”245
Others point to the value of fictional characters with the ability to function
as trademarks and the potential harm that would result if confusing use of
characters were permitted.246
When trademark protection persists after the expiration of a copyright
term, the passage of a fictional character into the public domain is
necessarily limited, with the scope of this limitation to be crafted by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. In the 1970’s, two important cases
provided the foundation for the analysis of the trademark/copyright
divide.247 In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the plaintiffpublisher acknowledged that the copyright term for the books at issue had
expired.248 Despite this important fact, the publisher sought trademark
protection for eight illustrations found in the original books.249 The
defendant argued that its use of the illustrations was permissible simply
because the illustrations were a “part of the once copyrighted works now in
the public domain.”250 However, the court did not find the defendant’s
argument persuasive, stating:
The fact that a copyrightable character of design has fallen
into the public domain should not preclude protection under
the trademark law so long as it is shown to have acquired
independent trademark significance, identifying in some way
the source or sponsorship of the goods. Because the nature of
the property right conferred by copyright is significantly
different from that of trademark, trademark protection should
be able to co-exist and possibly to overlap with copyright
protection without posing preemption difficulties.251
Thus, the court recognized the possibility of concurrent trademark and
copyright protection as well as the possibility of trademark protection
existing beyond the expiration of a copyright term. Even more, the court
noted that, “[d]ual protection under copyright and trademark laws is
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters.”252
Nevertheless, Warne presented insufficient evidence to support a finding of
245
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acquired distinctiveness identifying the publisher as the producer or
sponsor of the goods and as a result, the case was remanded.253
The Warne court was not alone in recognizing the potential for
providing both copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters.
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, the district court held that providing trademark protection
for the plaintiff’s logo was inappropriate; it was concerned that such
protection would create a copyright monopoly for uncopyrighted
designs.254 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, overruling the lower court’s
opinion and stating specifically that “trademark laws are based on the
needed protection of the public and business interests, and there is no
reason why trademarks should ever pass into the public domain by the
mere passage of time.”255 The court stated further that if:
[A]n individual selects a word or design that might otherwise
be in the public domain to represent his business or product .
. . . [and] that word or design comes to symbolize his product
or business, . . . the individual acquires a property right in the
mark. The acquisition of such a right through use represents
the passage of a word or design out of the public domain and
into the protective ambits of trademark law.256
The result is no different where a fictional character once protected by
copyright passes into the public domain. If the fictional character serves a
trademark function, it will be removed from the public domain in the same
manner as any other trademark.257 The Fifth Circuit therefore opened the
door to concurrent copyright and trademark protection of fictional
characters, and established that such trademark protection would not expire
at the conclusion of a copyright term.
While many courts have recognized the possibility of trademark
protection continuing after the expiration of a copyright term, other courts
have recognized that once granted, such protection may be problematic. In
a special concurrence, Judge Nies expressed her reservations in granting
trademark registrations to three-dimensional representations of Superman,
Batman and the Joker.258 Judge Nies was concerned that where a
“copyrighted doll design is also a trademark for itself, there is a question of
whether the quid pro quo for the protection granted under copyright has
253
Id. at 1198. Decided in 1979, before the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, the Warne court did not specifically address trademark dilution. Nonetheless, the decision also
did not rule out the possibility of maintaining concurrent and continuing trademark dilution protection.
254
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been given, if, upon expiration of the copyright, the design cannot be used
at all by others.”259 This scenario presents an extreme example, wherein a
previously copyrighted character that would otherwise be a part of the
public domain under copyright law is entirely prevented from entering the
public domain by virtue of trademark law. In such an instance, the public
domain is not enriched by even a single element of the previously
copyrighted work. Instead, it can be argued that the monopoly granted
during the copyright term served only to facilitate the copyright owner’s
development of the acquired distinctiveness necessary for trademark
protection, and the public receives nothing in exchange for the grant of a
copyright monopoly.
The concern expressed by Judge Nies is certainly valid; yet it may also
be argued that the public has in fact gained something valuable in
exchange for the grant of a copyright monopoly—the creation of a new
trademark. Naturally, the value of the exchange is contingent upon the
appropriateness of the grant of trademark protection in the first place. The
decision to extend trademark protection therefore becomes even more
essential to ensuring that the quid pro quo of copyright is maintained.
The limits of trademark protection for previously copyrighted works
were reached in Comedy III Productions v. New Line Cinema.260 In this
case, the defendant released the motion picture A Long Kiss Goodnight,
containing a clip from a Three Stooges short film playing on a television
set in the background of a scene for less than thirty seconds.261 The
plaintiff sought damages for violation of the Lanham Act, alleging that the
clip contained an enforceable trademark “because it [wa]s particularly
distinctive of ‘The Three Stooges’ comedy, whereas other clips . . . [we]re
not so distinctive to be trademarks.”262 In denying trademark protection for
a film clip whose copyright term had expired, the Ninth Circuit recognized
the broader implications of the plaintiff’s claims:
[T]he footage at issue here was clearly covered by the
Copyright Act, . . . and the Lanham Act cannot be used to
circumvent copyright law. If material covered by copyright
law has passed into the public domain, it cannot then be
protected by the Lanham Act without rendering the
Copyright Act a nullity.263
Comedy III thereby reaffirmed the independence of copyright and
trademark, and demonstrated the unwillingness of courts to allow one to
improperly supplant the other.
259
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V. AVOIDING THE PERPETUAL COPYRIGHT
The Supreme Court recently redefined the boundaries of the
copyright/trademark divide in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.264 Twentieth Century Fox held the exclusive television rights to
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book, Crusade in Europe. However, Twentieth
Century Fox failed to renew the copyright in the television series, thereby
leaving the entire series in the public domain.265 In anticipation of the
fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Dastar acquired the beta
cam tapes of the original Fox television series, copied the tapes, and
released the series with only minor adjustments.266 Dastar sold the tapes as
its own, making no reference to the original Fox series.267 Fox alleged that
Dastar’s television series infringed upon Fox’s rights under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act by making a false representation as to the origin of the
series.268
The Supreme Court’s decision turned on the statutory interpretation of
the word “origin” in §43(a) of the Lanham Act.269 Dastar argued that the
word “origin” included only the manufacturer or producer of the physical
goods, while Fox argued that the word “origin” included the creator of the
underlying work.270 In construing the Lanham Act, the Court cautioned
against the misuse or over extension of trademark into areas traditionally
occupied by copyright.271 Specifically, the Court was concerned that
“allowing a cause of action under §43(a) for [Dastar’s] representation
would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s
federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights.”272 The Court
concluded that the term “origin” refers to the “producer of the tangible
goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept,
or communication embodied in the goods . . . [for] to hold otherwise would
be akin to finding that §43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and
copyright, which Congress may not do.”273 Based on this definition of
264
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“origin,” Dastar had made no false representations as to the origin of the
goods and therefore did not infringe on Fox’s trademark interests in the
original television series.
While the Dastar decision did not directly address intellectual property
protection of fictional characters, Dastar did clarify that upon expiration of
a copyright term, there exists an absolute right to copy the work without
any identification of its creative source.274 This proposition will likely be
cited by future defendants who copy public domain characters without
authorization.275 Nonetheless, this over-simplified line of argument will
fail as Dastar did not object to the mere possibility of copyright and
trademark protection, but only to the granting of improper protection.276
The Dastar decision should serve as an important case for fictional
characters as the Court’s narrow definition of “origin” arguably heightened
the secondary meaning requirement for fictional characters. Numerous
characters are highly recognizable, having some form of secondary
meaning to the consuming public. Nonetheless, Dastar requires that the
character is not merely associated with an author or an illustrator generally,
but is instead associated with the actual producer or sponsor of the tangible
goods on which the character appears.277 Dastar therefore serves to
strengthen the proposition set forth in Warne, which required the contested
illustrations to indicate the producer of the physical books, the publisher,
and not simply Beatrix Potter, the author.278 Cases such as DC Comics v.
Unlimited Monkey Business, where the court found the Superman and
Wonder Woman characters to constitute protectable trademarks based on
mere association between the trademark image and the characters
themselves, are not likely to withstand challenges under Dastar.279
Trademark protection should not be upheld based on a “convenient
fiction”280 of source identification. Dastar specifically requires that a
character serve as an indicator of the source of the tangible product with
which it is associated, such that trademark protection should not be granted
based on mere popularity or general public recognition alone. Trademark
protection should only be granted where a fictional character possesses the
distinct ability to identify the source or sponsor of tangible products,
namely its ability to serve as a trademark.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, the intellectual property protection provided to fictional
characters has been riddled with uncertainty. In copyright law, courts have
routinely adjusted standards for protection, often confusing the state of the
law to such a degree that lower courts are forced to analyze the question
under every possible test to avoid reversal.281 Yet the necessity for
evaluation of the appropriateness of copyright protection for a given
character far outweighs any concerns regarding the complexity of the
analysis or the ability of courts to appropriately conduct it. Copyright
protection must not be extended to ideas. If an intricate analysis is
required to prevent such an extension, it is justified, and must be conducted
before the question of substantial similarity is addressed.
Trademark and unfair competition laws provide several avenues for the
protection of fictional characters with an ability to serve as indicators of
source.282 As with copyright protection, it is important that trademark
protection be extended only where warranted. Courts have often failed to
apply the statutory requirements of trademark law in a rigorous and
principled manner, continually deciding cases based upon the general
public recognition of a fictional character as opposed to the true source
identifying nature of the proposed mark.283 Adherence to the statutory
requirements set forth in the Lanham Act provides numerous methods for
ensuring that trademark protection is extended only to fictional characters
that serve the goals of trademark law. Acquired distinctiveness, single
source identification and likelihood of confusion standards present
important obstacles to trademark protection of fictional characters and each
must be established independently before trademark protection is properly
granted.284
The unique ability of fictional characters to serve expressive as well as
source identifying functions allow protection to be granted under both
copyright and trademark doctrines. That said, where copyright and
trademark protections overlap, copyright fair use is potentially
compromised.285 Courts should therefore pay particular attention to the
alleged fair use, focusing on traditional copyright fair use concepts, in
order to prevent the analysis from becoming subsumed by the public
recognition of the fictional character. Where trademark protection persists
following the expiration of a copyright term, Dastar and Frederick Warne
281

See supra Parts II.A, B.
See supra Part III.
283
See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc., 598 F. Supp. at 115, 119–20 (granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment where “marks have acquired outstanding celebrity and have obtained virtually
universal recognition in the United States and throughout the world as unique”).
284
See infra Parts III.A, B, C (discussing the element of distinctiveness in trademark protection).
285
See infra Part IV (discussing concurrent trademark and copyright protection).
282

2009]

PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

961

should guide the analysis and help ensure that the public domain is not
improperly restricted.286 A fictional character must indicate the origin or
sponsorship of the tangible good to which it is connected to be a proper
subject of trademark protection.287 Association with the author, the
original work, or simply the character itself, must not provide the basis
upon which trademark protection is granted. The removal of a fictional
character from the public domain following an expiration of the copyright
term is only warranted where the fictional character serves the proper
source identifying function. In the absence of such an association,
trademark protection for fictional characters will create nothing more than
an impermissible, perpetual copyright.
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